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Abstract. Third-party apps enable a personalized experience on so-
cial networking platforms; however, they give rise to privacy interdepen-
dence issues. Apps installed by a user’s friends can collect and potentially
misuse her personal data inflicting collateral damage on the user while
leaving her without proper means of control. In this paper, we present
a multi-faceted study on the collateral information collection of apps in
social networks. We conduct a user survey and show that Facebook users
are concerned about this issue and the lack of mechanisms to control it.
Based on real data, we compute the likelihood of collateral information
collection affecting users; we show that the probability is significant and
depends on both the friendship network and the popularity of the app.
We also show its significance by computing the proportion of exposed
user attributes including the case of profiling, when several apps are
offered by the same provider. Finally, we propose a privacy dashboard
concept enabling users to control the collateral damage.
1 Introduction
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become a dominant platform for people to
express themselves, interact with each other and get their daily entertainment.
By design and popularity, Facebook has morphed into a massive information
repository storing users’ personal data and logging their interaction with friends,
group, events, and pages. The sheer amount and potentially sensitive nature of
such data have raised a plethora of privacy issues for Facebook users, such as
the lack of user awareness, cumbersome privacy controls, accidental information
disclosure, unwanted stalking, and reconstruction of users identities, see Wang
et al. [22].
Applications, providers, permissions, and control. Complicating the
Facebook privacy landscape, users can also enjoy apps for a personalized social
experience. Apps can be developed either by Facebook itself or by third-party
app Providers (appPs). Facebook relies on permission-based platform security
and applies the least privilege principle to third-party apps. For installation and
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Fig. 1. a. Facebook app architecture, b. Collateral information collection
operation, each app requests from the user a set of permissions, granting the app
the right to access and collect additional information (steps 1 to 4 in Fig. 1.a).
After the user’s approval, apps can collect the user’s personal data and store it
on servers outside Facebook’s ecosystem and completely out of the user’s control
(steps 5 to 6).
Initially, Facebook enabled apps to collect profile attributes of users’ friends
by assigning separate permissions to each profile attribute. Later, Facebook has
replaced this with a single permission to conform with US Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) regulations on data collection [3]. Conformity notwithstanding,
apps are still able to collect up to fourteen profile attributes via friends [20]. Of
course, users have app-related privacy controls at their disposal; however, they
are scattered at multiple locations, such as the user’s personal profile (visibility
levels per attribute) or the apps menu (attributes friends can bring with them to
apps). Taking into account that default settings are very much pro-sharing, frag-
mented and sometimes curiously worded, privacy control settings could promote
incorrectly set policies or complete neglect from users [22].
Privacy interdependence, profiling, and legislation. The suboptimal
privacy controls and the server-to-server (and potentially oﬄine) communication
between Facebook and appP make any protection mechanism hard to apply [9].
As a result, the user’s profile items can be arbitrarily retrieved by an appP with-
out automatic notification or on-demand approval by the user through friends.
Since the privacy of an individual user is affected by the decisions of other users
(being partly out of their control), this phenomenon is referred to as privacy
interdependence [6]. From an economic point of view, sharing a user’s informa-
tion without her direct consent can lead to the emergence of externalities. While
sharing someone else’s information may yield benefits for her (positive external-
ity, e.g., personalized experience in social apps), it is also almost certain to cause
a decrease in her utility (negative externality, e.g., exposed profile items). Exist-
ing research is limited to pointing out the existence of and risks stemming from
such negative externalities in the Facebook app ecosystem [6], and its potential
impact on app adoption [16, 17].
Neglected by previous work, third party appPs can be owners of several apps
(e.g., appP1 offers app A1, A2, A3 and A4, see Fig. 1.b). For instance, Vipo
Komunikacijos and Telaxo are appPs offering 163 and 130 apps, among those
99 and 118 with more than 10, 000 monthly active users, respectively (extracted
from the Appinspect dataset [5]). As a consequence, an appP may cluster several
apps and thus get access to more profile items. Moreover, every app retrieves the
Facebook user ID that uniquely identifies a user over apps; hence, the appP could
build a combined full profile of the user. We refer to this process as profiling,
analogously to the term used in the context of consumer behavior in market-
ing [13]. However, with the help of apps installed by a user’s friends, appPs could
profile a user partly or entirely without her consent, which constitutes a privacy
breach, and could induce legal consequences.
From the legal point of view, both the European Data Protection Directive [2]
and the guidelines of FTC [3] require prior user consent for the collection and
usage of personal data by data controllers (i.e., Facebook or appPs). According
to FTC, apps cannot imply indirect consent through privacy settings; while the
European Commission requires transparency and fairness from the data con-
troller about the nature, amount, and aim of data collection: this requirement is
not met here with data processing potentially going beyond the users’ legitimate
expectation.
Motivated by the above privacy issues of Facebook apps we define as collateral
damage the privacy loss inflicted by the acquisition of users’ personal data by
apps installed by users’ friends, and by appPs offering multiple apps thereby
enabling user profiling.
Contribution. We have identified four research questions to further our
understanding of indirect and collateral information collection in the case of
Facebook apps.
– Are the users aware of and concerned about their friends being able to share
their personal data? We conducted an online survey of 114 participants, to
identify the users’ views on collateral information collection, lack of notifi-
cation and not being asked for their approval. Our survey provides evidence
that participants are very concerned and their concern is bidirectional: the
large majority of users wants to be notified and potentially restrict apps’
access to profile items both when their friends might leak information about
them and vice versa.
– What is the likelihood that an installed app enables the collateral information
collection? We develop a formula to estimate the probability of this event. We
show how the likelihood depends on the number of friends and the number of
active users of apps. Moreover, based on results obtained from simulations,
we show how the likelihood depends on specific network topologies and app
adoption models.
– How significant is the collateral damage? We develop a mathematical model
and quantify the proportion of user attributes collected by apps installed
only by the user’s friends, including the case of profiling, when several apps
belong to the same appP. We compute the significance on several snapshots
of the most popular Facebook apps using the Appinspect dataset [5].
– How can we raise user awareness and help them make informed decisions?
For this end, we discuss a dashboard that enhances transparency by provid-
ing an overview of installed apps and the type and total amount of profile
attributes collected by apps and, more importantly, appPs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the user
survey. Section 3 presents the mathematical model of collateral damage and cal-
culates the likelihood of a user being affected by collateral information collection.
Section 4 extends the model and quantifies collateral information collection illus-
trated by a case study of popular apps. Section 5 presents the high-level design
for a privacy dashboard providing users with proper notifications and control.
Section 6 describes future work and concludes the paper.
2 User survey
In this section, we tackle the research question: “are users concerned about col-
lateral information collection?” To answer this question, we conducted an online
survey investigating users’ views about the disclosure of personal data by Face-
book apps installed by the users’ friends, and to identify users’ concerns about
unconsented information collection on Facebook; 114 participants answered the
survey. Participants were recruited from the authors’ direct and extended friend
circles (including mostly, but not only, Facebook friends). Hence, a large pro-
portion of participants have an age between 20 and 35 and are well educated.
We found that users are concerned about collateral information collection in
general, and remarkably concerned when information collection is unconsented.
Furthermore, the majority of users prefer to take action to prevent collateral
information collection. We have to stress that our survey provides us with evi-
dence that users are concerned about the information collection of apps through
their users’ friends. However, we are not able to extrapolate our findings to the
general Facebook population.
2.1 Methodology
After a short introduction, our survey consisted of four main parts. First, we
assessed users’ standpoints and concerns about default privacy settings and the
lack of notification for indirect and unconsented information collection. This
assessment is necessary to be able to differentiate users who are concerned in-
dependent of their intentions to take actions against such practices. The second
part of the survey explores what type of personal data on Facebook users find
most sensitive. The third part of our survey is twofold: 1) whether users want to
be notified when their friends’ apps can collect their personal data or when their
installed apps can collect personal data of their friends; 2) which actions users
prefer to take in such cases. Users replied the survey questions by marking their
responses on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 stands for “not concerned at all and 5
stands for “extremely concerned”; we also provided a text field where necessary.
The fourth part of the survey collects demographics and information regarding
the participants’ use of Facebook apps.
2.2 Results
For the first part, we observe that for all four statements users show concern
(see Fig. 2). For example, 66% of users are at least very concerned about the
default privacy setting of Facebook that allows apps to collect information from
the user’s friends. Similarly, 77% of users are at least very concerned about not
being notified when their friends enable collateral information collection and 67%
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Fig. 2. Results for the first part of the survey where we asked participants about their
opinions on four statements regarding default settings, lack of notification (for friends
and for the user herself), and lack of consent for collateral information collection (CIC).
for not being notified when one of the user’s own apps can collect their friends’
information. Finally, 81% of users are at least very concerned about collateral
information collection through apps of their friends without their approval. Note
that Golbeck et al. [11] have investigated how informed users are regarding
the privacy risks of using Facebook apps. Their findings show that users do
not always comprehend what type of data is collected by apps even when they
have installed the app themselves. Therefore, it is safe to assume incomplete
understanding of apps installed by their friends, which is in line with our results.
Note that in Fig. 2, there is a slight difference between participants opinion on
statement B on the one hand and statements C and D on the other hand for
users which are not concerned. This difference might be because statement B
is directly related to the users’ information loss. Moreover, statement B would
burden the user less than C and D, where action by the users is required.
For the second part of our survey, we found that although users are concerned
about a number of attributes, the sensitivity is relatively subjective and differs
between users. However, it is noteworthy that certain attributes are standing out
and have been marked as sensitive by a large proportion of the participants. For
example, most of the users identify photos (84% are at least very concerned),
videos (79%), their current location (76%), and family and relationships (54%)
as sensitive profile attributes. The least sensitive profile attributes are proved
to be to be birthday and sexual orientation. Note that the sensitivity of the
attributes is likely to depend on the context. For example, although a birthday
attribute might seem harmless on its own, participants might feel different if a
weather app would be collecting this information.
In the third part of the survey, we found that 77% of users always want to be
notified when friends’ apps can collect their personal data, 22% only want to be
notified in particular cases, while only about 1% do not want to be notified at all.
Moreover, 69% of users always want to be notified when their apps are collecting
information from their friends, 27% in particular cases, and only about 1% not
at all. We observe that users are also seriously concerned about damaging their
friends’ privacy: this corroborates findings on other-regarding preferences from
the literature [8, 18]. Notification tools can be very useful to enhance privacy
awareness for unconsented data collection. Note that Golbeck et al. have shown
that the privacy awareness of users can be changed significantly through edu-
cational methods [11]. When participants were asked which action they would
want to take if notified that friends’ apps are about to collect their information
(multiple answers allowed), 99 out of 114 participants answered that they would
restrict access to their personal data while 8 participants answered that they
would unfriend their Facebook friend. Only 5 participants answered that they
would take no action. We have to stress that the reaction of a user may strongly
depend on the relationship between the user and their friends. When partici-
pants were asked what action they would want to take if they are notified that
one of their apps is about to collect their friends’ information (multiple answers
allowed), 64 out of 114 replied that they would restrict access to their friends’
personal information for this app. Only 5 out of 114 answered that they would
take no action. The answers to the questions in the third part help to confirm
that the answers of our participants in the first part were not due to salience
bias; participants who were concerned in the first part about not being notified
for the collateral information collection replied that they also want to take an
action in the third part.
The last part of our survey collected demographics and statistics about Face-
book and app usage. Participants were between 16 and 53 years old with an
average age of 29 years. They have had their Facebook accounts for between 6
months and 10 years, respectively. Moreover, 69% of our participants have in-
stalled an app at least once, and among those 87% have installed 1 or 2 apps
in the last six months. 54% of the participants were female, 42% male while 4%
preferred not to disclose their gender. Participants varied greatly in their number
of friends, from 10 to 1000. 51% changed their privacy settings on Facebook; 79%
restricted who could see their profile information, 41% who could see them in
searches, and 35% who can collect their information through friends apps (mul-
tiple answers were allowed). Interestingly, users who already took an action by
restricting their permissions to their friends apps by 90% choose to be notified
too. One explanation could be that privacy settings on Facebook are constantly
changing and tracking these changes might be cumbersome [22]. Furthermore,
82% of our participants had higher education, where 55% had IT background
based on personal interest and 44% through higher education. We conclude from
our survey that users are concerned about the collateral information collection,
and prefer being notified and try to prevent such type of information collection.
3 Likelihood of Collateral Information Collection
In this section, we investigate the likelihood of a user’s friend installing an app
which enables collateral information collection. We build a simple mathematical
model and develop a formula to estimate the probability this event occurs. Then,
we present case studies taking into account different friendship network topolo-
gies and app adoption models. Furthermore, we use the Appinspect dataset [5]
to instantiate our estimations, and resort to simulations for computing the prob-
ability for different network types.
Let an Online Social Network (OSN) with k users and the corresponding set
be denoted by the set F , i.e., F = {u1, . . . , uk}. The user is denoted by u, with
u ∈ F . Let f be a friend of u and Fu the set of u’s friends, i.e., f ∈ Fu. Clearly,
http://http://iraklissymeonidis.info/survey.
Fu ⊆ F . Moreover, let Aj an app and L the set of all Ajs that are offered by the
OSN to every ui, and s the size of the set, i.e., L = {A1, . . . , As}. Moreover, let
AUj be the number of users who have installed Aj . For our likelihood estimation
we consider the number of Monthly Active Users (MAU) to represent the number
of active users. For instance, currently Facebook has k = 1.3 × 109 users (i.e.,
MAU) [19] and more than s = 25, 000 Apps [5].
To estimate the likelihood that u’s personal data can be collected via the Aj ,
installed by f , we compute the probability of at least an arbitrary f installing any
available Aj . Let Q
f be the probability of f installing Aj which enables collateral
information collection. For all the friends of u (i.e., Fu) the probability of not
installing any Aj is the product of probabilities for each f (this assumes that
these probabilities are independent, which seems a reasonable approximation).
Let Ω be the probability of at least one of u’s friends installing Aj (regardless if
u has installed Aj), i.e.,
Ω = 1−
∏
f∈Fu
(1−Qf ) . (1)
First, we compute the likelihood Ω when the probability for a friend of the
user installing an app is uniformly distributed among all friends.
Case study 1 – uniform distribution. Each f decides whether to install
Aj without considering any app adoption signals from other users. The proba-
bility of at least a friend of u installing Aj is uniformly distributed among u’s
friends, and equals 1 − Q (Remark: Q = Qf1 = · · · = Qfk′ where 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k).
Q is then computed as all users who installed the app divided by the number of
users of the OSN (in the active user sense):
Q =
AUj
|F| . (2)
We used the publicly available Appinspect dataset provided by Hubert et
al. [12, 5] to extract the range of MAU of apps which enable collateral information
collection. The dataset consists of 16, 808 Facebook apps between 2012 and 2014.
It contains the application name, id, number of active users (daily, weekly and
monthly) and the requested permissions. To illustrate the influence of different
values of MAUs on Ω, we consider the upper tier of apps, i.e., over 500, 000
MAU, while the most popular app that collects friends’ data has 10, 000, 000
MAU, therefore 5 · 105 ≤ AUj ≤ 1 · 107. To cover most users, we assume the
number of friends for a given u (|Fu|) to be between 0 and 1000. Finally, we
estimate the population of Facebook to be 1.1 · 109 MAU for the period of 2012
to 2014 [19].
For Ajs with AUj ≥ 5 · 106 the probability Ω grows steeply with the average
number of friends (see Fig. 3.a). For an average of 200 friends the probability
Ω is more than 0.6. For a user with 300 friends and more, the probability Ω
exceeds 0.8. (Note that most Facebook users have more than 200 friends [21].)
From Eqns. (1) and (2) it is clear that Ω depends strongly on AUj . For instance,
our most popular app TripAdvisor has approximately 1 · 107 MAU (i.e., AUj ≈
1 · 107); assuming that on average a user has 200 friends [21] (i.e., |Fu| ≈ 200).
https://www.facebook.com/games/tripadvisor.
Fig. 3. Likelihood of collateral information collection based on a. real data [5] (left,
per MAU) and b. simulations (right, with k = 10, 000 and d = 30).
Considering F = 1.1 · 109 (the population of Facebook) we estimate that the
probability of at least one of u’s friends installing TripAdvisor is larger than 78%
(Ω ≥ 0.78).
Case study 2 – non-uniform distribution. Realistic social networks do
not conform to the uniformity assumption. Network degree has been reported
to follow a power law [15, 24] and the clustering coefficient has been found to be
much higher than in random networks [15]. Moreover, app adoption has been
proclaimed to be affected by different signals [16]. We have resorted to simula-
tions in order to introduce these factors into the estimation of the probability
Ω.
Our simulations generate synthetic networks to compute Ω. Regarding the
friendship network, we have considered three different, well-known models: Bara-
ba´si-Albert [4] (BA), Watts-Strogatz [23] (WS), and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi [10] (ER). Regard-
ing app adoption, two different models have been implemented: uniform (unif),
where all users install an app with the same probability (that is, independently
of installations by their friends); and preferential (prop), where the probability
of a user installing an app is proportional to the number of its friends that have
already installed the app.
Regarding the simulations, for each of the configurations (pairs of network
and app adoption models), we have computed the probability Ω for one of the
user’s friends installing an app with respect to the fraction of the users of the
network that installed the app. To make the results of different network models
comparable, we fixed both the number of nodes in the network, k, and the
mean degree, d. Then, we tuned the parameters of the models to achieve these
properties.
We performed simulations for network sizes k ∈ [100, 10, 000] and mean de-
gree d ∈ [10, 60]. Due to space constraints we include the results of just one
set of simulations, but the conclusions we have drawn can be extrapolated to
the other tested settings. Fig. 3.b draws the probabilities obtained from net-
works with k = 10, 000 and d = 30 (results averaged over 100 simulations)
and from the analytical uniform app adoption case. Most of the configurations
give probability values very close to those obtained when using the formula;
the three exceptions are: ba-unif, ws-prop, and ba-prop. The Baraba´si-Albert
model generates graphs with a few very high degree nodes (hubs) and lots of low
degree nodes. When combining networks generated with the Baraba´si-Albert
model with a uniform app adoption model, the probability for a hub to install
an app is the same as for any other node. To the contrary, when combining BA
with the prop app adoption model, hubs have a higher probability of installing
the app than non-hubs, since having a higher degree makes them more likely
to have (more) friends with the app installed. As a consequence, each installa-
tion affects, in mean, more users, and thus Ω increases. Concerning ws-prop,
the Watts-Strogatz model generates very clustered networks; when an app is in-
stalled by a member of a community, it gets adopted by all other members easily.
However, each new installation inside the same community implies a small in-
crease on the overall Ω, because most of the users affected by the installation
were already affected by installations from other members of the community.
We observe that the probability computation (i.e., Ω) is conditioned on both
the network and app adoption models. However, we found that there is a sig-
nificant probability for a user’s friend to install an app which enables collateral
information collection for different networks and app adoption models.
4 Significance of Collateral Information Collection
In this section, we develop a mathematical model and compute the volume of
the user’s attributes that can be collected by apps and appPs when installed by
the users’ friends. Our calculations are based on several snapshots of the most
popular apps on Facebook using the Appinspect dataset [5].
Users and users’ friends. Each user ui in an OSN (i.e., ui ∈ F) has
a personal profile where each u can store, update, delete and administer her
personal data [7]. A u’s profile consists of attributes ai such as name, email,
birthday and hometown. We denote the set of attributes of a u’s profile as T
and n as the size of T , i.e., T = {a1, . . . , an}. For instance, Facebook currently
operates with a set of n = 25 profile attributes. Let Fu∗ be the union of u’s friends
and the u itself and f∗ an element of Fu∗, i.e., f∗ ∈ Fu∗. Clearly, Fu∗ = {u}∪Fu
and Fu ∩ {u} = ∅, as u is not a friend of u. For instance, Fu∗ = {u, f1, . . . , fk′}
describes a user u and its k′ friends, where 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k.
Applications and Application providers. Let L be the set of apps an
app provider (appP) can offer to every ui in an OSN and s the size of this set, i.e.,
L = {A1, . . . , As}. Let Aj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, be the set of attributes that each Aj can
collect, i.e., Aj ⊆ T . Each Aj is owned and managed by an appP denoted by Pj .
The set of Ajs that belong to Pj it is denoted by Pj , i.e., Pj ⊆ L. The set of all
Pjs is denoted by AP and m the size of the set, i.e., AP = {P1, . . . , Pm}. From
our analysis we identified s = 16, 808 apps and m = 2055 appPs on Facebook
indicating that a Pj can have more than one Aj , i.e., Pj = {A1 . . . As′} with
1 ≤ s′ ≤ 160 [5].
4.1 Profiling
Application j. When Aj is activated by f
∗ (i.e., f∗ ∈ Fu∗), a set of attributes
ai can be collected from u’s profile. We denote by A
u,Fu∗
j an Aj that users in F
u∗
The expected clustering coeff. can be adjusted with the rewiring prob. parameter.
installed and as Au,F
u∗
j the set of attributes ai that A
u,Fu∗
j can collect from u’s
profile. Clearly, Au,F
u∗
j ⊆ Aj ⊆ T . The set of all Au,F
u∗
j s installed by the users in
Fu∗ is denoted by Lu,F
u∗
. Clearly, Lu,F
u∗ ⊆ L.
We denote by ~ai a vector of length n which corresponds to ai, i.e., ~ai =
[
1
0 . . . 0
i
10 . . .
n
0]. Moreover, we consider ~Au,F
u∗
j as a vector of length n, which cor-
responds to Au,F
u∗
j , i.e.,
~Au,F
u∗
j =
∨
a∈Au,Fu∗j
~a ⇔ ~Au,Fu∗j [i] =
{
1 if ai ∈ Au,F
u∗
j ,
0 if ai /∈ Au,F
u∗
j ,
(3)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
Note that:
– x ∪ y =
{
z = 0 if x = y = 0,
z = 1 otherwise.
and ~x ∨ ~y = ~z where ~x[i] ∨ ~y[i] = ~z[i].
For instance, an Au,F
u∗
j = {a1, ai, an} is represented as ~Aj = ~a1 ∨ ~ai ∨ ~an =
[
1
10 . . . 0
i
10 . . . 0
n
1]. It represents the attributes that can be collected by Aj when
is installed by f (i.e., the user’s friend).
Application provider j. Each appP consists of a set of Au,F
u∗
j s denoted
by Pu,F
u∗
j which users in F
u∗ installed. Each Pu,F
u∗
j can collect attributes of u’s
profile. To identify which ais can be collected by Pj we consider ~P
u,Fu∗
j as a
vector of length n (i.e., n ∈ T ), which corresponds to Pu,Fu∗j , i.e.,
~Pu,F
u∗
j =
∨
A∈Pu,f∗j
f∗∈Fu∗
~Au,f
∗
=
∨
A∈Pu,Fu∗j
~Au,F
u∗
. (4)
Note that: ~Pu,F
u∗
j =
∨
f∗∈Fu∗
~Pu,f
∗
j = (
~Puj ∨ ~Pu,f1j ∨ · · · ∨ ~Pu,fij ), where Fu∗ =
{u, f1, . . . , fi} and ~Pu,u = ~Pu.
The complexity of this operation for all f∗ in Fu∗ is O(n× |Pu,Fu∗j |).
4.2 Degree of collateral information collection
Friends f of u (f ∈ Fu) allow access to u’s profile by installing Ajs. We denote
by Πu
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
the number of attributes that can be collected by Aj exclusively
from u’s friends (and not through the user herself, i.e., u /∈ Fu). Let ~Πu
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
be a vector of length n which Πu
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
provides, where n = |T |, where
~Πu
Auj ,A
u,Fu
j
= ~A′uj
∧
~Au,F
u
j . (5)
Note that: ~x′ ∧ ~x = [10 . . . n0] and ~x′ ∨ ~x = [11 . . . n1].
The complexity of this operation for all f∗ in Fu∗ is O(n4 × |Auj | × |Au,F
u
j |).
Similarly, we denote by ~Πu
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
the number of attributes that can be col-
lected by Pj exclusively from u’s friends in F
u, i.e.,
~Πu
Puj ,P
u,Fu
j
= ~P ′uj
∧
~Pu,F
u
j . (6)
4.3 The case of Facebook applications
To examine the problem, we extended our analysis for the apps (i.e., Ajs) and
appPs (i.e., Pjs) on Facebook using the Appinspect dataset [12, 5]. For each
Aj , apart from the application name and id, the dataset provides us with the
requested permissions and the Ajs each Pj owns. We computed the proportion
of attributes an Aj and Pj can collect through: 1) the user’s friends and the
user herself (i.e., profiling, Fu∗) and 2) only the user’s friends (i.e., degree of
collateral information collection, Fu). From 16, 808 apps, 1202 enables collateral
information collection. Our analysis focuses on Ajs and Pjs that have more than
10, 000 MAU; there are 207 and 88 respectively in each category.
Profiling, Fu∗. Performing the analysis over the dataset, we found that
72.4% of Ajs and 62.5% of Pjs can collect one attribute from F
u∗. For all Ajs and
all Pjs, 48.6% and 28.7% of attributes which are considered sensitive by the par-
ticipants of our survey (such as photos, videos, location and family-relationships)
can be collected. Considering location related attributes such as current location,
hometown, work history and education history, the proportion of attributes that
can be collected are 23.5% from Ajs and 23.2% from Pjs.
Degree of collateral information collection, Fu. For Ajs installed only
by Fu, 28.9% of them show a degree of collateral information collection equal to
1; similarly, 36.3% of all Pjs. Moreover for F
u, we identified that the proportion
of sensitive attributes that can be collected from Ajs and Pjs is 46.8% and 37%,
respectively; while the proportion of collectable location related attributes is
22.5% for Ajs and 36.9% for Pjs.
We conclude that the size of the two sets of sensitive attributes, collected via
profiling versus exclusively through friends, are both significant and, surprisingly,
comparable to each other. We also found that a considerable amount of attributes
concerning the user’s location can be collected by either Ajs or Pjs.
5 Damage Control: Privacy Dashboard
Our survey results have shown that users from our survey are not only concerned
about the collateral information collection: they also want to be notified and
restrict access to their personal data on Facebook. They also consider removing
the apps that can cause collateral damage. The need for transparency calls for a
Transparency Enhancing Technology solution, raising awareness of personal data
collection and supporting the users’ decision-making on the sharing of personal
data [14, 1]. Hence, we propose a dashboard that can help users to manage their
http://iraklissymeonidis.info/Fb_apps_statistics/.
Fig. 4. Privacy dashboard: user interface concept
privacy more efficiently, and control the collateral information collection (see
Fig. 4 for an initial user interface design). Technically speaking, the dashboard
illustrates how the user’s data disclosure takes place through the acquisition
of the user’s personal data via apps (and respective appPs) installed by their
Facebook friends. It displays the nature and proportion of the user’s personal
data that can be collected by apps and, more importantly, appPs.
From our survey, we have concluded that Facebook users are more concerned
about certain types of personal information such as photos, videos, location, and
relationships. Our dashboard can accommodate the visualization of profiling and
the degree of collateral information collection by assigning different weights to
each attribute in the user’s profile. These weights can be then manually fine-
tuned by the user. Detailed design and implementation of the dashboard remain
the next step in our future work. Additional information such as claimed purpose
of collection by the apps can be added in the dashboard. Moreover, further
functionality can be added to the dashboard such as leading the users from the
dashboard to uninstall the app (this would follow the European Data Protection
Directive 95/46/EC [2]).
Finally, our survey shows that users also care about the damage that they
might cause to their friends by installing apps (bidirectional concern). Comple-
menting the privacy dashboard, we will also look into providing transparency
with an enriched app authorization dialogue at the time of installation. Building
on the basic design in [22], the enriched dialogue will direct the attention of users
to the existence and volume of collateral damage to-be-inflicted on their friends.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented a multi-faceted study concerning the collateral
damage caused by friends’ apps in social networking sites. Using a user survey,
mathematical modeling, and real data from Facebook, we have demonstrated
the importance and quantified the likelihood and significance of such collateral
information collection. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, we have been
first to report the potential user profiling threat that could be achieved by appli-
cation providers: they can gain access to complementary subsets of user profile
attributes by offering multiple apps.
Our main findings are the following. First, our survey shows that the vast ma-
jority of users are very concerned and would like proper notification and control
mechanisms regarding information collection by apps installed by their friends.
Also, they would potentially like to restrict apps’ access to profile items both
when their friends’ apps might collect information about them and vice versa.
As for future work, we are aiming at conducting similar surveys among users of
social platforms other than Facebook, and extending the demographic range of
participants. We also intend to investigate the relevance of the users concerns and
demographic background, attribute values, and sensitivity to particular contexts
(e.g., via use cases).
Second, we have quantified the probability that a user is affected by the col-
lateral information collection by a friend’s app. Assuming a simple app adoption
model, an app with more than 500, 000 users may indirectly collect information
from the average user with 80% likelihood, irrespective of the user itself having
installed the app or not. Moreover, non-uniform app adoption and network mod-
els also yield high likelihood. As future work, we aim to extend our simulations
regarding both network size and realistic app adoption models.
Third, based on real data, we have quantified the significance of collateral
information collection by computing the proportion of attributes collected by
apps installed by the users’ friends. We have found that a significant proportion
of sensitive attributes, such as photos, videos, relationships and location, can
be collected from apps either by the user’s friends and the user herself (i.e.,
48.6%) or exclusively from the user’s friends (i.e., 46.8%); surprisingly, these
values are comparably high. Furthermore, a considerable amount of location-
related attributes can be collected by both friends’ apps and profiling appPs. As
a future work, we aim to enrich our mathematical model by incorporating other
parameters such as sensitivity.
Finally, we outline a conceptual design for a privacy dashboard which is
able to notify the user about the existence and extent of collateral damage, and
empower her to take restrictive actions if deemed necessary. We also hint that
an enriched app authorization dialogue would complement the dashboard by
providing estimates on potential damage to the user’s friends at the time of
installation. The detailed design and implementation of these solution concepts
constitute important future work for us.
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